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STATEME~NT

OF THE KIND OF CASE

rrhis is an action for personal injuries and for propt•l'ty darnag<:> arising out of an accident involving vehicles
driv0n h~· the parties.
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DISPOSITION IN Lff\VER COURT
The case was tried to a jury. The Court submitted
a special verdict consisting of six "Propositions.'' After
deliberating, the jury returned with ansvYers to the Propositions, (see Addendum to this Brief, Page 17), the
Court advised the jury that their answers were inconsistent and the jury was again instructed to retire for
further deliberations. The jury thereafter returned with
corrected answers, (see Verdict No. 2, Addendum, Page
18). The Trial Court, after po lling and questioning the
jurors individually and at length, entered .Judgment in
favor of the Plaintiff.
0

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant-Appellant seeks an Order directing that
Judgment be entered in favor of the Defendant, no cause
for action, in accordance with the verdicts of the jury,
or in the alternative, for a reversal of the Judgment and
a new trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This law suit arose out of a vehicle collision on September 2, 1965 approximately one mile south of Chester,
Utah on U 11, which is a hard-surfaced north-south
hi1rhwav
providin()'
one lane of travel for either direction.
b
,)
b
The day was clear, the roads dry, the accident occurred
approximately 3 :30 p.m. (T-7)
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Hoth parties were driving trucks southbound, the
Plaintiff overtaking the Defendant.
'L1 he Defendant's pick-up truck was equipped with
automatic turn signals with the left front signal on the
top of the left front fender, and the rear signal in the
nsnal place on the left rear of the truck. The Plaintiff
t<•:-;tifi<>d that he did not see the turn signal and therefore
starkd to pass the Defendant's vehicle when the Defendant made a left turn directly into his path. Plaintiff
then swerved right, applied brakes, and Jeft brake marks
81 feet before impact ( T-88) and struck the right rear
portion of the Defendant's vehicle, then·after upsetting
off the west edge of the road.
'l1lrn Plaintiff had not sounded his horn prior to attempting to pass. ( T-81)
The case was tried to a jury who were submitted
t;peeial Interrogatories.
After the jury had deliberated for some considerable
time, the Court called the jury back into session (T-1201'-121); they had not reached a verdict and were again
excused to return to the jury room for further deliberation.
After further considerable deliberations, the jury
returned to the courtroom and announced that they had
n~ached a verdict. ( T-122) 'rhe Special Interrogatories
wert- answered, as indicated in Verdict No. 1, Addendum
to this Brief, (T-122) which, as commented on later by
the Court in the absence of the jury, resulted in a verdict
for tht> Defondant, No Caust> for Action. However, the
Court made the following state111Pnt to the jury:
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" ( T-122) The Court: I think I should return
the verdict to you and ask you to reconsider it.
You have found on Proposition No. 2 that thti
Defendant was negligent in not giving an adequate
signal that the Defendant intended to make a left
turn.
You say he did not give enough of a signal
for the car in back to see it. You say that did not
cause the accident.
·
On the contributory negligence you say the
Plaintiff was negligent in failing to see a signal.
You say before, he did not give a signal could
be seen, so that he could not be negligent in failing
to see one that could not be seen.
Do you see the inconsistency 1"
The Court then instructed the jury to agam retire
for further deliberations.
The Defendant excepted to the Court's action in
ordering further deliberation on the grounds that the
verdict as returned was not contradictory.
After further lengthy deliberation8 the Jury agam
returned to the Courtroom with answers to the Special
Interrogatories, as indicated on Y erdict No. 2, Addendum
to this Brief. Again, this verdict, as returned by the
jury resulted in a verdict of No Cause for Action for
the Defendant.
The Court then polled the jury during which there
was considerable confusion evidenced by the individual
jurors, but at the conclusion of said questioning, judgment was entered for the Plaintiff in the amounts returned by tlw jun~ in Y Prdict No. 2.
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ARUUMEN'11
POINT

ONE

THE ORIGINAL VERDICT, AND THE VERDICT AS
IT NOW STANDS, ENTITLES DEFENDANT TO A
JUDGMENT OF NO CAUSE FOR ACTION.

11 he original jury verdict vms clearly for the Defendau.t. The "corrected'' verdict again was in favor of the
Defendant. Yet, the Court has entered judgment for the
Plaintiff.
'rhe answers which the Honorable Lower Court
found inconsistent were to Propositions Numbers 2 and
+; that is ( 2), Defendant did not give an adequate signal,
and ( 4), Plaintiff was contributorily negligent "in failing
to keep a proper lookout for a signal or indicatio·n that
the Defendant was intending to turn to the left".
These answers are not inconsistent, inasmuch as the
Defendant had testified, which the jury had a right to
believe, that for one-quarter of a mile he had gradually
slowed the speed of his vehicle from 35 miles per hour
to what the Plaintiff admitted ~was "moving very slowly".
This was in a GO mile per hour zone with private roads
leading to pastures and farmlands on either side, all of
which the Plaintiff admitted.
Certainly the jury had a right to find that the Plaintiff, as a reasonable and prudent motorist, should have
reali1wd that the vehide ahead was slowing for some
purpo1'(' and that lw should not he p<>rmitted to simply
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assume, under tl10se facts, that the Ddendant intended
to proceed straight ahead.
Furthermore, the jury found that the Defendant's
negligence in failing to signal was not a proximate cause
of the accident, which they had a right to find, inasmuch
as it was admitted that the Plaintiff, who estimated his
own speed at 35 to 40 miles per hour, left 81 feet of skid
marks before impact, which, with the addition of the
distance traveled during reaction time, mdicates that at
the time he observed danger, his vehicle was 120-125 feet
behind Defendant. This is a very few feet from the distance required to completely stop. The actual impact,
however, was so severe as to cause the Defendant's vehicle to spin in a 180 degree turn.
In addition, the Defendant testified that at the moment of impact the Defendant's vehicle was 1wt blocking
the southbound lane of travel, which Plaintiff had been
occupying, and there \Vas ample room to pass to the rear
of the Defendant. For the above reasons the jury had
every right to find that even though they believed the
Defendant did not give an adequate signal, that was not
the proximate cause of the accident.
The intent of the jury to find for the Defendant and
against the Plaintiff is obvious.
At the time they first returned with a verdict, they
had not filled in the qitestiO'ns of Proposition No. 6, having to do with danwges. The foreman had signed the bottom of the second page. The fact is, therefore, that they
did not assess damages because they had found the issues
in favor of the Defendant.
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In 89 C.n-; THIAL~, 8Pction 570, Pg. ;).±3, the rule
stated:

"A special verdict, finding, or answer is to
be construed as a whole, and, where there are two
or more answers or findings, the ·Court is not
permitted to isolate one and ignore the other, but
they are to be construed together. Also, all the
:-:;pecial issu0s submitted to the jury for answt'r:-:
must lw eonsiden•d togetlH•r as a "·hole."
8ection 571.
"A special finding of the ,jury is binding on,
and may not be ignored or disr<•garded by the
Court, provided it is relevant and material to
the issue, and is warranted by the evidence, does
not contain an unwarranted conclusion of law and
has not been set aside on proper grounds.''
Even when the jury returned with its "corrected"
verdict, they did not correct their former finding that
the Defendant's negligence was not a proximate cause of
the accident. Neither the Court nor the jury corrected the
answer, and it still remains the ans\ver in the Record.
The Lower Court should be ordered to vacate the
judgment in favor of the Plaintiff, and to enter judgment for Defendant.
POINT

TWO

THE TRIAL COURT'S QUESTIONING AND POLLING OF THE JURY CONSTITUTED REVERSIBLE
ERROR.

rrrial .Judge aceused the ,jury of conflicting answers to Special Interrogatories, which were not. The
rl~he

8
jury was later required by the Court to vote in public,
in violation of their right to sPen~cy. And when thP
jury evidenced indecision and confusion, the Court did
not order them to again retire for further deliberations.
('l-1-122) ''rl1HE COURT: I think I should return
the verdict to you and ask you to reconsider it.
"You have found on Proposition No. 2 that
the Defendant was negligent is not giving an
adequate signal that the Dt>f endant intended to
make a left turn.
"You say he did not give enough of a signal
for the car in the back to see it. You say that did
not cause the accident.
"On the contributory negligence you say the
Plaintiff was negligent in failing to see a signal.
You say before, he did not give a signal could be
seen, so that he could not be negligent in failing
to see one that could not be seen.
"Do you see the inconsistency?''
"THE FOREMAN: 'We will consider it about
five minutes in the jury room'."
What the jury had actually found by their verdict
was:
1. The Defendant kept a proper lookout.
2. The Defendant did not give an adequate signal.
3. The lack of a signal ·was not a proximate cause
of the accident.
4. The Plaintiff was contributorily negligent for
not keeping a proper lookout for an indication
that Defendant intended to turn left (the gradual slowing to a "very slow speed" in a 60
milE:' per hour zone, his position in the highway, the presence of numerous side roads,
etc.).
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'l 1lw Trial Court also ovt>rlooked the fact that tlw jury's

an:-rn <'I' to No. ± was moot, in light with the ans\n'r:s to
tlw three other Propo8itions.

vVhen the jury Wa8 leaving the Courtroom to delibPrate further, and ina8much as the Foreman had signed
the bottom of Page 2 of the verdict, the Court said to
tlw Foreman:
(rr-126) "Don't overlook the instruction that the
verdict is to be signed at the end."
Not having theretofore answered Page 3 on damages,
and having been told to sign the bottom of page 3, the
jury was confused by the Court's statements, and delibf:.•rated over an hour further, and returned with the questions on damages answered. They had also changed the
answer to No. 4, because the Court in effect had told them
they must. But the jury verdict, as it now stands in the
Record, still found that the Defendant's negligence was
not a. proximate cause of the accident.
For the second time, the Court appeared to disbelieve what he saw, and decided to poll the jury. The
"polling", however, turned into searching inquiries on
questions not even asked on the verdict, and with an
insistence by the Court that if a juror showed any hesitancy, he must answer in the jury box. We quote examplPs;
(T-130) "THE COURT: Now let me ask you another question. Is it your opinion that the Plaintiff should not recover anything from the Defendant?
Mr. Nell, should he or should he not'?
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A.

He should.

Q.

You have found for the Plaintiff t

A.

Yes.

THE COURT: On this Proposition 3, there an·
six of you that have found that the failure to giv(•
a signal \Vas a provirnate cause, but your answer
on the verdict was that it was not a proximate
cause, you have answered "False'' on it.
That is inconsistent with your answer now that
it was a proximate cause.
(Yet the jury was not ordered to again retire.)
THE FOREMAN: The questions are confusing
back and forth. Maybe people used to it, it is clear,
but to us it was not.
THE COURT: Your opinion now, Mr. Nell, i~
that the lead automobile did not give adequate
signal and that was a proximate cause of the
collision?
A.

Yes.

Q.

That is your decision'!

A.

Yes.

Q.

Mr. Nell, you are of the opm10n that the
Plaintiff, the rear automobile driver, was
contributorily negligent in failing to keep a
proper lookout for the signal or some indication to turn - was the Plaintiff partly the
cause of that collision?

A.

We marked that over, he had to be wouldn't be.

Q.

You think the Plaintiff was not contributorily
negligent f

A.

Yes.

no, he

11

\Vas lw contrilmto1·iJ~· nPglign1t, or \\·a;-;n't lw !
He was not contribntorial"\·
ne(rliirPnt
.J
b
b
.
l\rr. Childs, 1vas he contributorily rn'gligPnt?
i\o, we voted that. I eorne to tlw dPci~ion lw
was not.
Q. MRS. MOSS'!
A. No, he was not.
Q. MRS. BLACK!
A. I don't knoil'.
Q. l\1RS . .MICKEL was the automobile follo\\·ing,
contributorily negligent in failing to kt'ep a
prnper lookout?
A. I would say, yt>s, to a certain extent.
Q. MR,. KENNER f
A. Yes.
MR. MOSS: I don't uelieve Mr. Kenner 1tnderstood.
THE COURT: Was the Plaintiff automobile, the
one coming up from the back, contributorily negligent by failing to kePp a proper lookout to see
if there was a signal fo rn left turn or any indication from it that it was going to turn to the left 1
A. 1 think he did. I think so. I think he did.
Q. That he was negligent?
A. No, that he was not.
Q. That he was not~
A. No, sir.
Q. This back automobile, was he contributorily
negligent, or not - the driver of it?
A. l don't think so.
Q. l\lR. HAFEN t
A. Yes.
Q. MR. ANDERSON·~
(~.

...\.
Q.
A.

1:2
A.
Q.

He was not.
l\IRS. BLACK, hace you nuu.le up your mi11d
011' it?
A. He was not.
Q. I will ask you again, \\·as the Plaintiff, thP
back car, contributorily negligent in that Jw
attempted to pass "-hen the Defondant-\Yhat
an ordinary prudent man would have seen
it was not safe to do so?
A. If he tried to pass when obviously it was not
safe to do so, he would be negligent.
Q. In that respect was he negligent, MR. NELL!
A. No, I don't think he was. etc.
In Cornia vs. Albertson's, 16 Utah 2d 145, 397 P2d
67, this Court stated:
"In the instant case the jury was brought into
open court and . . . conducted their voting and
exposed their individual answers . . . . "
The opinion then quotes with approval the following
language from Johnson vs. Maynard, 9 Ftah 2d 268, 3-±2
P2d 884:
" ... after the juror have retired to deliberate,
their privacy in sacrosanct. It is their exclusive
prerogative to determine the facts in their deliberations. For this purpose the privacy of the
jury room should be preserved from influencP
from outside sources or any semblance thereof ... "
Rule 49 (b) U.C.A., 1953 states:
"vVhen the answers are inconsistent with each
other . . . the Court shall not direct the entry of
judgment but may return the jury for further
considt'ration of its ::rnswers and vt>rdid or may
order a new trial.''
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( 'l(•arJ~- tlu• Trial Court, if it l°<'lt that tlw ~<'('ond
nrdid \rm; ineonsist<>nt \\·as lirnit('d to ordPri1w
th(' •1·1uY
b
.
to again r<>tin·, or to order a new trial. It had no right
to <frmand that tht> jury vot<' in puhlic individually, and
\\·i\11out th<' rig-ht to e<mfrr \\·ith <>aeh otlu•r in ~Perecy,
in an d'fort to eorrect th<• alh•ged inconsisten('y. ~et> 71
.\LH 2d G63.
POINT

THREE

THE COURT'S INSTRUCTIONS CONSTITUTED REVERSIBLE ERROR.

'!'lw Court's Instruction No. 9-J stated:

''There is no duty on the driver of an automobile to sound the horn upon his intPnding to
pass another vehicle."
At rr-118, the Defendant excepted to the Court's
refusal to instruct with relation to the statutory require111ents of -H-6-55 (b) and ±1-G-146, as well as this Defendant'R Re q u l-' st e d Instructions (R-17) concerning
sounding of the horn.

-U-6-1-Hi, Utah

Cod<~

Annotated, provides:

" (a) Every motor vehicle when operating
upon a highway shall be equipped with a horn in
good working ordPr . . . the driver of a motor
vehicle shall, when reasonably necessary to insure
safo operation, give audible warning with his
horn, but shall not otherwise nse such horn when
npon a highway."
-t 1-Ci-f1:l ( h) states :
"Except when overtaking and passing on the
rig-lit is iwrmitted, tlw drin·r of an overtaken
vPhitle shall ho·ivP \\"CW• to the rii.d1t
in favor of the
"
ovPrtaking vPhi<'lt• on amlihl<• ~ip;nal ... ''

1·1
Under the above instruction of the Honorable Comt,
the jury was advised that under no circumstances would
the Plaintiff he required to sound his horn.
In 111 anning 1·s. Pou;ers, 117 l 'tah
this Court stated:

:no,

215 P2d 396,

"The Court, by Instruction No. 10, in effect
instructed that the driver of a vehicle intendingto pass another vehicle does not, under all circumstances, owe the duty of sounding his horn,
but rather that the sounding of the horn is left
to the judgment of the operator in the exereisP
of due care. vV e see no error in the Instruction.
It comports with Sec. 27-7-206, subsection (a),
lLC.A. 1943, wherein it is provided:

'* * * The driver of a motor vehicle shall when
reasonably necessary to insure safe operation give
audible warning with his horn but shall not otherwise use such horn when upon a highway'."
"True, in Sec. 57-7-122, subsection (b) U.C.A.
l 943, it is provided that the driver of a vehicle
overtaken on the highway by another shall givr
way to the overtaking vehicle on audible signal.
Since the Court below gave an instruction based
upon that status, appellant contends that the two
instructions on the sounding of a horn are inconsistent. \Ve do not so construe them, nor do we
believe that the jury could be misled thereby. The
instructions in question dealt with different fact
situations."
In N aislJitt 'i·s. Eggett, 5 Utah 2d 5, 295 P2d 832,
at 834, the Court states:
''Plaintiff further cites as negligence, the
failure of Defendant to give "·a1ning of his HJJ-
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proach to tlw inkrscdion, l'.C.A. Hl53, -l-1-(i-1-!G
provides that, 'The driver of a motor vehicle shall
wlwn n·asonahly nPeessary to insun· safo 01wration gin' audible warning \rith his horn hut shall
not otlwn\'ise use such horn wlwn upon a high"·a.'··' rl'his sPction has bet'n intPqJJ"eted as not
pla('inp; a duty upon a driver to :-;ournl hi:-; horn
in an.'· particular traffic situation, lmt instead to
require due carr i11 tlic exercise nf j11dg111e1it as
lo 11·hrt71er s11ch 1n1rning is 11crrs,ary. Jlanni11g P'.
Powers, 117 Ftah 310, :215 P2d ::39(i'."

'Failure to give a u·unzi11g sig11al does not
co11stit11te 11e,r7lf.(;encc ithen there is no apparent
necessity for such (/. iutrnin,q. Nelso11 vs. Lott, 81
Utah 2G5, 17 P2d 272.'
In the case at Bar, there was a jury question as to
whether the Plaintiff, in not sounding his horn under
the circumstances "exercised due care in the exercise of
judgrnPnt" in not sounding his horn.
rrhis accident occurred in a GO mile per hour zone;
the Defendant, while Plaintiff was coming up from the
rear, had slowed from :15 miles per hour ( T-105) to what
the Plaintiff admitted was a "very slow" speed .(T-79)
The area was farm and pasture hmd with many
private roads leading from the highway. ( T-7) The
Defendant was driving an old pick-up truck, obviously
a farm vehicle.
Certainly the jury had a right to find that Plaintiff
was negligent for not sounding his horn in anticipation
that the "verY
slowly. movinoYPhidP" intPrnled to change
•
0
itl' eonrf:<' of travel.

lt)

In fact, the jury in their first verdict, found that
Plaintiff was negligent for not keeping a proper lookout
for "an indication" that Defendant intended to turn left.
The Court's refusal to properly instruct the jury,
and to leave the question of fact to the jury's decision on
whether the Plaintiff was negligent in not sounding his
horn under the circumstances, constituted reversible
error.
SUMMARY
The original jury verdict was m favor of the Defendant.
The Court ruled there was an inconsistency which
did not exist. Even so, the "corrected" verdict was again
in favor of the Defendant. Again, the Court ruled there
was an inconsistency, but did not again order the jury
to retire, but insisted each juror vote in Open Court. All
of the errors were against the Defendant, not the Plaintiff. A judgment should be ordered based on the jury
verdict, or in lieu thereof, a new trial should be granted.
Respectfully submitted,

L. l!J . .t\llDGLEY
-H5 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorney for Appellant
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ADD1£NDL;_M
Vl£RD1Crr NO. l n'-122)
Prnpo:::;ition No. 1. 'l'he Defendant was
lll'gligPnt in failing to keep a proper and :::;uffi<'it>nt lookout for car:::; approaching from the
rear.
·•False·'
Proposition No. 2. The Defendant was negligent in not giving an adequate signal of tlw
DPfendant':::; intention to turn to the left.
''True"
('l'-U Proposition No. 3 had not been an:-;\n'rPcl and the Court handed the verdict back
to thP foreman who wrote in the answer, showed it to the other juryrnent and the verdict was
thPn returned to the Judge.)
Proposition No. 3. The negligence of the
DE>fendant that we have found on Proposition
No. __________ or Proposition No.----------, was a proximate cause of the collision.
"False"
Proposition No. 4. The Plaintiff was contributorily negligent in failing to keep a proper
lookout for a signal or indication that the Defimdant was intending to utrn to the left.
"True"
Pro1Josition No. 5. The Plaintiff was contri lrntorily negligent in attempting to pass the
Defendant's truck when an ordinary prudent
lllan would have seen that it ,,-as not safe to do
w.
"False''
Proposition N o.u. (on damages - Page 3)
and the subparagraphs were not answered.
'l11w verdict was signed at the bottom of
Paw' 2 by the Foreman.
At T-122-123 the Court advised the jury
that tlwi r verdict was inconsistent and asked
tlwm to again retiri>. As the jury was leaving
th\' Courtroom the Court stated: "Don't overlook tht> instruction that t]w verdict is to be
"i,~nPd at the end.'' (T-12G)
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ADDENDUM
VERDIOT NO. 2 (T-126 et seq)
Proposition No. 1. rrhe Defendant was negligent in failing to keep a proper and sufficient
lookout for cars approaching from the rear.
"False"
Proposition No. 2. The Defendant was negligent in not giving an adequate signal of the
Defendant's intention to turn to the left.

"True"

Proposition No. 3. The negligence of the
Defendant that we have found on Proposition
No. __________ or Proposition No. __________ was a proximate of the collision.

"False"

Proposition No. 4. The Plaintiff was contributorily negligent in failing to keep a proper
lookout for a signal or indication that the Defendant was intending to turn to the left.
"False"
Proposition No. 5. The Plaintiff was contributorily negligent in attempting to pass the
Defendant's truck when an ordinary prudent
man would have seen that is was not safe to
do so.
"False''
Proposition No. 6, relating to damages,
was filled in and the verdict signed on the lines
provided.
After questioning the jurors at length, the
Court entered .Judgment for Plaintiff.
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